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MCQUEEN V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL
COUNCIL: PRESENTING THE QUESTION OF THE
RELEVANCE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
TO THE TOTAL REGULATORY TAKINGS
ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent remand ofthe South Carolina Supreme Court case McQueen v.
South Carolina Coastal Council' presents an unresolved issue involving the
relationship between the public trust doctrine andregulatory takings law. After
the McQueen case was appealed from the South Carolina Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court2
to be heard in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Palazzolo
v. Rhode Island?
Part II of this Note outlines the twisted path the McQueen case has taken
in the shadows of the Palazzolo and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council4
decisions and explains the relationship between the public trust doctrine and
regulatory takings law. Part I discusses the public trust doctrine as viewed by
other states and details South Carolina's current view of the doctrine. Part IV
analyzes how the public trust doctrine relates to regulatory takings actions,
particularly those involving tidelands. Part V then revisits the McQueen case,
questioning whether the State of South Carolina can successfully defend a
takings claim by using the public trust argument. Finally, Part VI opines that
the State should prevail in the McQueen case and argues that any other result
would have a negative effect on coastal tidelands.
II. ATTEMPTING TO APPLY THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO REGULATORY
TAKINGS LAW
A. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In 1991, SamMcQueen applied to the South Carolina Coastal Council' for
permits to backfill wetlands and to build bulkheads to prevent further erosion
1. 340 S.C. 65, 530 S.E.2d 628 (2000).
2. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 121 S. Ct. 2581 (2001).
3. 121 S. CL 2448 (2001).
4. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
5. "The South Carolina Coastal Council is now known as the South Carolina Department
of Health and Environmental Control, Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management"
McQueen, 340 S.C. at 67 n.1, 530 S.E.2d at 629 n.1.
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on two lots in Cherry Grove, South Carolina.6 McQueen had purchased one lot
in 1961 and the other in 1963, and the two lots lay adjacent to a man-made,
saltwater canal.7 Over the course of thirty years, considerable erosion had
occurred on the property.8 In 1993, the Coastal Council denied McQueen's
request for permits to bulkhead and backfill his property "because the proposed
bulkheads were located within 'the tidelands critical area, so that any backfill
[would] result[] in the filling of tidal wetlands." 9
McQueen sought review of the Coastal Council's decision before the
Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel; the Panel upheld the denials of
both permits, finding that the permits "were prohibitedby S.C.Code Ann.Regs.
30-12(G)(2)(a) . . ., which provides that the creation of residential lots for
private gain is not justification for filling in wetlands and that permit
applications for this purpose should be denied."'" McQueen then appealed to
the circuit court, which referred the case to a master-in-equity." The master-in-
equity found that a taking had occurred without just compensation because the
denials had deprived McQueen of "all economically beneficial use" of his
property. 2 The court of appeals affinned, holding that "McQueen ha[d]
suffered a textbook taking."'"
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals' decision and held that no taking had occurred. 14 To make this
determination, the supreme court applied the Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City5 " test, which requires the landowner to establish the
following:
(1) there was a denial of economically viable use of the
property as a result of the regulatory imposition;
6. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 329 S.C. 588, 591-92, 496 S.E.2d 643,
645-46 (Ct. App. 1998).
7. Id. at 591, 496 S.E.2d at 645.
8. Id. at 592, 496 S.E.2d at 645.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 592, 496 S.E.2d at 646.
11. Id.
12. McQueen, 329 S.C. at 592-93, 496 S.E.2d at 646.
13. Id. at 600, 496 S.E.2d at 650.
14. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 77, 530 S.E.2d 628, 635
(2000).
15. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). In Penn Central, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed several
factors that should be considered in determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's
decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance.
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly,
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the
character of the government action.
Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 53: 509
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(2) the property owner had distinct investment-backed
expectations; and
(3) the interest taken was vested in the owner, as a matter of
state property law, and not within the power of the state to
regulate under common law nuisance doctrine. 6
The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the second element dealing
with investment-backed expectations was the crucial issue in this case because
"[w]ithout the requirement of investment-backed expectations, a property
owner could obtain a windfall by claiming a taking in the face of new
regulations, without any real intent to develop., 17 The court held that
McQueen's "prolonged neglect of the property and failure to seek
developmental permits in the face of ever more stringent regulations
demonstrate[d] a distinct lack of investment-backed expectations," and
therefore there was not a regulatory taking.18 In finding that no taking had
occurred, the court seemed to place a great deal of significance on McQueen's
neglect of his property and his failure to actively take steps to protect or
develop it.'9
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the judgment,
remanding the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court to be reheard in light
of its recent decision in Palazzolo.
20
B. Palazzolo: Clarifying Lucas and Reversing McQueen
In Palazzolo, a landowner sued the State of Rhode Island after he was
denied permits to fill wetlands in order to develop his property.2' The
landowner argued that the State's denial was based on regulations that were
enacted after he purchased his property and that he therefore suffered a
regulatory taking.' Unlike McQueen, Palazzolo was only a partial regulatory
takings case; the landowner was not deprived of all economically beneficial use
of his property because the uplands portion of the property still had
development potential."3 Much of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Palazzolo involved a complex, fact-specific discussion of standing,24 and that
16. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 69, 530 S.E.2d at 630-31 (quoting Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v.
United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
17. Id. at 74, 530 S.E.2d at 633.
18. Id. at 76-77, 530 S.E.2d at 634-35.
19. Id. at 70,530 S.E.2d at 631. "In the instant case, [McQueen] neglected his property for
thirty years, allowed the land to revert to wetlands, and now expects the State of South Carolina
to pay him the going rate for high ground-a twenty-fold return on his initial investment." Id.
20. McQueen v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 121 S. Ct. 2581 (2001).
21. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 121 S. Ct. 2448, 2455 (2001).
22. Id. at 2454-56, 2462-64.
23. Id. at 2464-65.
24. Id. at 2458-64.
20021
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portion of the opinion has no relevance to the remand of the McQueen case.
However, the Court's holding that the Penn Central test2S should be applied
when the regulation in question does not deprive the landowner of all
economically beneficial use of the property is of great importance.26
Apparently, the South Carolina Supreme Court erred when it applied the
three-part Penn Central test27 in McQueen; therefore the court misinterpreted
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.28 The Lucas decision established that the Penn Central tests should
be applied only to determine if there has been a partial regulatory taking; in
determining whether a total taking has occurred, the proper inquiry is whether
the "regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."3
In McQueen, the State conceded that the permit denial deprived McQueen of
all economically beneficial use of his property.31 Therefore, the South Carolina
Supreme Court erred by applying the Penn Central test;32 the court should not
even have considered whether McQueen had investment-backed expectations
because McQueen was not a partial regulatory takings case.3
C. Lucas: Introducing the Idea of Background Principles of State Law
InLucas, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "Where the State seeks to sustain
regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his
title to begin with."34 Thus, the only way the state can defend a complete taking
without compensation is by showing that the landowner did not have a pre-
existing right to use his property due to "background principles of the State's
",35law of property and nuisance ....
25. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
26. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
27. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
28. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
29. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
30. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1017-18.
31. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 69, 530 S.E.2d 628, 631
(2000) ("It is uncontested the permit denial at issue here deprives [McQueen] of all economically
viable use of his property.").
32. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
33. For an in-depth discussion of why the South Carolina Supreme Court was wrong in
McQueen, see Nikki Lee, Note, McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council: Misinterpreting
Lucas, 52 S.C. L. REV. 815, 816 (2001) (arguing that because McQueen was deprived of all
economically viable use of his property, he should have been entitled to compensation without
further analysis unless background principles of common law would have prevented him from
building bulkheads and filling his property).
34. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
35. Id. at 1029.
[Vol. 53: 509
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InLucas, the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case to the South Carolina
Supreme Court with instructions to make such a determination, stating as
follows:
The question . is one of state law to be dealt with on
remand. We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina
must do more than proffer the legislature's declaration that
the uses Lucas desires are inconsistent with the public
interest, or the conclusory assertion that they violate a
common-law maxim such as sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas . .. South Carolina must identify background
principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses
[Lucas] now intends in the circumstances in which the
property is presently found. Only on this showing can the
State fairly claim that, in proscribing all such beneficial uses,
the Beachfront Management Act is taking nothing.36
Identifying the principles of law that preclude McQueen from using his
land as he wishes is precisely what the South Carolina Supreme Court
addressed in its original hearing ofMcQueen, and the court will have to address
this issue with respect to the public trust doctrine in the future.
D. The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principle of State Law
In McQueen, the South Carolina Supreme Court considered whether
background principles of state law barred McQueen from filling his lots.37 The
State argued that Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council3" represented a
background principle of state nuisance and property common law. 39 In Carter,
the supreme court held that denying a permit to fill wetlands "was not a taking
because '[a]n owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
[essential] natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which
it was unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of others."'
However, the McQueen court held that Lucas partially overruled Carter with
the following statement:
[R]egulations that leave the owner of land without
economically beneficial or productive options for its
use-typically, as here, by requiring land to be left
substantially in its natural state-carry with them a
36. Id. at 1031-32.
37. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 70-73, 530 S.E.2d at 631-33.
38. 281 S.C. 201,314 S.E.2d 327 (1984).
39. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 71, 530 S.E.2d at 631.
40. Carter, 281 S.C. at 205, 314 S.E.2d at 329.
2002]
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heightened risk that private property is being pressed into
some form of public service under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm.4 '
However, it appears that on remand the State may have another
background principle argument that could bar a landowner from filling
wetlands on his property-the public trust doctrine. In a footnote in the
McQueen decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that amici curiae
had argued numerous other potentially applicable background principles of the
law.42 The most significant of these arguments was the public trust doctrine,
which states generally that "the state owns the property below the high water
mark of a navigable stream [and that] this property is part of the public trust."43
Despite the argument's promise, the court declined to address it for two
reasons-the State's failure to argue the issue in the lower courts, and the
supreme court's decision to reverse on other grounds, namely McQueen's lack
of investment-backed expectations.'
Now that the case has been remanded to the South Carolina Supreme Court
to be reheard in light of Palazzolo, the public trust doctrine may be the State's
only remaining significant argument. Presumably, the State has lost its
argument that McQueen had no investment-backed expectations because it
conceded that McQueen suffered a total loss of all economically beneficial use
of the land.4" Furthermore, with its ruling in the Lucas case, the supreme court
has rejected the aforementioned background principle described in Carter."
Thus, given that the public trust doctrine may be the State's final hope for
achieving a favorable outcome in McQueen, the State must effectively argue
that the public trust doctrine trumps the private interests in the land.47
41. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 73, 530 S.E.2d at 633 (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
42. Id. at 70 n.2, 530 S.E.2d at 631 n.2.
43. Id., 530 S.E.2d at 631 n.2 (citing Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119,
127-28, 456 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1995); State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 541, 193 S.E.2d 497, 500
(1972); State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 75 (1884)).
44. Id.
45. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
47. If the public trust argument is denied in the rehearing of McQueen, destruction of the
wetlands in question will not occur directly; rather, McQueen will be compensated for the value
of his property. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 141 (1978) ("The Fifth
Amendment provides in part: 'nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation"') (citation omitted). However, such compensation could have highly undesirable,
indirect results from an environmental standpoint. For example, compensating McQueen in this
case could lead to the repeal or amendment of regulations that prevent filling tidelands in order
to avoid compensating similarly-situated landowners. Thus, the supreme court's decision as to
whether the public trust doctrine is a background principle of state common law could be crucial
to the future of South Carolina's tidelands.
[Vol. 53: 509
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II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DoCTRiNE
A. Other States' Views of the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine is a common law property concept which
provides that certain lands and waters, including tidelands and navigable
waters, are held in trust for the public and can be used only for the public's
interest. 8 This ancient doctrine has its roots in Roman law, which "recognized
that all persons were entitled to the use of natural resources, including the air,
running water, the sea and the seashore, so long as each person's use did not
interfere with the rights of another."'49 This principle was subsequently adopted
by English common law, which determined that lands held in public trust
included all lands below where "'the sea flows and ebbs,"' thus introducing a
tidality standard.5" American courts generally followed the English tidality-
based public trust doctrine and also extended the doctrine to include non-tidal
navigable fresh waters."
The purpose of the modem public trust doctrine was perhaps best
explained by the California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court ofAlpine County:
[T]he public trust is more than an affirmation of state
power to use public property for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
commonheritage ofstreams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands,
surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when
the abandonment of that right is consistent xvith the purposes
of the trust.
52
The current status of the public trust doctrine with regard to tidal wetlands
is described in the 1988 U.S. Supreme Court decision Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi. 3 In this case, Phillips Petroleum had title to several tracts of
land, including forty-two acres of tidal wetlands, which could be traced back
to pre-statehood Spanish land grants.54 Mississippi argued that the states were
given ownership of all tidelands upon entering the Union, regardless of the
48. Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court FinallyDrainedthe Swamp of Takings
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and
Coastal Barrier Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 36 (1995).
49. Paul Sarahan, Wetlands Protection Post-Lucas: Implications of the Public Trust
Doctrine on Takings Analysis, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 537, 558 (1994).
50. Id. at 558 (quoting The Royal Fisheries of the Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. 540,541 (1604)).
51. Id. at558-59.
52. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 685 P.2d 709, 724 (Cal.
1983).
53. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
54. Id. at 472.
2002]
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tidelands' navigability.5 Phillips Petroleum countered that the proper test for
application of the public trust doctrine was one of navigability rather than of
tidality.56 The Mississippi Supreme Court held that the public trust
encompassed all lands subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, including non-
navigable tidewaters. 7
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed on appeal, holding that upon entry into
the Union, states received ownership of all lands subject to the ebb and flow of
the tides.58 The Court then elaborated on the purpose behind holding tidelands
in public trust:
[S]everal of our prior decisions have recognized that the
States have interests in lands beneath tidal waters which have
nothing to do with navigation. For example, this Court has
previously observed that public trust lands may be used for
fishing-for both "shell-fish [and] floating fish." On several
occasions the Court has recognized that lands beneath tidal
waters may be reclaimed to create land for urban expansion.
Because of the State's ownership of tidelands, restrictions on
the planting and harvesting of oysters there have been upheld.
It would be odd to acknowledge such diverse uses of public
trust tidelands, and then suggest that the sole measure of the
expanse of such lands is the navigability of the waters over
them.59
Phillips is also an important case as it reaffirms the notion that states have
"the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to
recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit. 60 Thus, each state has the
ability to determine the scope of its public trust doctrine, and different public
interests can be protected by the doctrine in different states.6' Therefore, in
discussing the relevance of the public trust doctrine toMcQueen, it is important
to analyze the scope of South Carolina's public trust doctrine and the interests
that it seeks to protect.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 472-73.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 476.
59. Phillips Petroleum Co., 484 U.S. at 476 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 475 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894)).
61. See Sarahan, supra note 49, at 561-62.
[Vol. 53: 509
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B. The Public Trust Doctrine in South Carolina
While there are relatively few cases dealing with the public trust doctrine
in South Carolina,6 2 the majority of these cases deal with tidal wetlands in the
coastal regions.63 However, the cases discussing tidelands typically focus on the
extent of State ownership,64 the ability of the State to convey the tidelands,6' or
the tidelands' navigability;66 therefore, few are particularly relevant to the
present discussion.
The first South Carolina case dealing with the public trust doctrine was
State v. Pacific Guano Co.67 Pacific Guano was a trespass action where the
defendants raised an adverse possession defense to their use ofanavigable tidal
stream, claiming that the stream beds were part of a grant from the State.68 The
South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the public trust doctrine for the first
time, stating:
The state had in the beds of these tidal channels not only
title as property, thejus privatum, but something more, the
juspublicum, consisting of the rights, powers, and privileges
derived from the British crown, and belonging to the
governing head, which she held in a fiduciary capacity for
general and public use; in trust for the benefit of all the
citizens of the state, and in respect to which she had trust
duties to perform. The absolute rule heretofore referred to,
limiting land owners bounded by such streams to the high
water mark, unless altered by law or modified by custom,
accords with the view that the beds of such channels below
low water mark are not held by the state simply as vacant
62. For a comprehensive discussion of South Carolina cases dealing with the public trust
doctrine, see Kenneth R Moss, The Public Trust Doctrine in South Carolina, 7 S.C. ENVTL. L.J.
31,42-51 (1998).
63. Id. at 42.
64. See id. at 43-44.
65. See, e.g., Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachem, 272 S.C. 392,396,252 S.E.2d 133, 135-
36 (1979) (holding that the government had the power to grant tidelands to subjects who
exercised private ownership and that unless there is a plat clearly showing a grant of land below
the high water mark, the boundary of the property conveyed extends only to the high water
mark); State v. Fain, 273 S.C. 748, 752, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1979) (holding that there must be
specific language either in the deed or in the plat to satisfy the requisite intent necessary to prove
a state's grant of tidelands).
66. See, e.g., Heyward v. Farmers Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 153, 19 S.E. 963, 972 (1894)
(holding that the proper test for navigability is whether a stream is capable of valuable
commerce).
67. 22 S.C. 50 (1883).
68. Id. at 70-71.
2002]
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lands, subject to grant to settlers in the usual way through the
land office.69
Subsequent South Carolina cases affirmed that the public trust includes
land below the high water mark of tidal, navigable streams." The case that
most accurately and succinctly expresses the public trust doctrine with regard
to tidelands is Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia Carolina
Canning Co.,7 where the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that "[t]he title
to land below [the] high-watermark on tidal navigable streams, under the well-
settled rule, is in the State, not for the purpose of sale, but to be held in trust for
public purposes. 72 Cape Romain is still good law in South Carolina today; in
the recent case Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. State, the court stated that
"[t]he State of South Carolina holds presumptive title to all tidelands within its
borders, which are held in trust for the benefit of the public."73
One limitation of the public trust doctrine is that it does not bar any
modifications to or use of tidelands; this limitation is clearly evidenced by the
fact that docks are commonly constructed over coastal marshes for private
rather than public use.74 Instead, the doctrine simply presumes that title to
tidelands belongs to the State7s and that the public has the right to use the areas
between the high and low water marks.7"
In order to establish private ownership of tidelands, the claimant must
show that he, or the person from whom he acquired title, possessed a grant
from either the State or the British crown.77 A grant of private ownership must
include "specific language, either in the deed or on the plat, showing that [the
grant] was intended to go below the high water mark."'71 The State
presumptively holds title to this public trust land, and the individual claiming
title has the burden of rebutting the presumption.79
69. Id. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
70. See, e.g., Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia Carolina Canning Co.,
148 S.C. 428,438,146 S.E. 434,438 (1928) (declaring certain lands to be for the public benefit).
71. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
72. Id. at438, 146 S.E. at 438.
73. No. 3388, 2001 S.C. App. LEXIS 121, at *6 (S.C. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2001).
74. See Heyward v. Farmers' Mining Co., 42 S.C. 138, 158, 19 S.E. 963, 973 (1894)
(disallowing the construction of a dock that affected the navigability of a watercourse).
75. See Coburg Dairy, Inc. v. Lesser, 309 S.C. 252,253,422 S.E.2d 96,97 (1992) (stating
that the state is the presumptive owner of marshlands).
76. See, e.g., Lowcountry Open Land Trust, 2001 S.C. App. LEXIS 121, at *6 (holding that
"[t]he State of South Carolina holds presumptive title to all tidelands within its borders, which
are held in trust for the benefit of the public.").
77. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50,74 (1883).
78. Hobonny Club v. McEachern, 272 S.C. 392,396,252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1979) (quoting
State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 543, 193 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1972)).
79. State v. Fain, 273 S.C. 748, 752, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1979).
[Vol. 53: 509
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In the recent case Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Associates," the South
Carolina Supreme Court elaborated on some of the policy considerations
involved in the public trust doctrine. For the first time, the court held that the
State can never lose control of lands held for the public trust "except as to such
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the
lands and waters remaining."'" Furthermore, the court noted that in order to
determine whether to allow private use of public trust land, it is necessary to
consider whether the private use would substantially impair the public's interest
in the land.82 When such an analysis involves tidelands, relevant factors include
the effects on "marine life, water quality, [and] public access to the area."83
Importantly, the court further stated that the Coastal Council is charged with
the duty of administering public trust lands in coastal areas." For reasons which
will be discussed below,8" Sierra Club likely sheds the most light on the
applicability of the public trust doctrine to regulatory takings law.
IV. RELATING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE REGULATORY TAKINGS
ANALYSIS WITH REGARD TO TIDELANDS
The public trust doctrine appears to qualify as a background principle of
state property law that can be used as a defense to a total regulatory taking.86
However, courts have addressed this issue sparingly, especially in the context
of the public trust doctrine's being used as a defense to a total takings claim
vis-d-vis tidelands. No South Carolina court has addressed this question
precisely, but the few decisions offered by other jurisdictions indicate that the
public trust doctrine should be recognized as a background principle in South
Carolina regulatory takings jurisprudence.
In Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, the federal government denied a
Tennessee plaintiff's miningpermit applicationbased on the mining's potential
adverse impacts on soil.87 The plaintiff sued, alleging a regulatory taking;88 on
appeal the U.S. Court of Federal Claims found for the defendant and held that
the Tennessee Water Control Quality Act served as a background principle of
state law as established in Lucas.89 The Act provides that "the waters of the
state, including its groundwaters, as property of the state, [were] held in public
80. 318 S.C. 119,456 S.E.2d 397 (1995).
81. Id. at 128, 456 S.E.2d at 402 (quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
453 (1892)).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See infra Part IV.
86. See supra notes 34-35.
87. Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 111-12 (1999).
88. Id. at 109.
89. Id. at 114.
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trust, and subject to a right of 'the people of Tennessee, as beneficiaries of this
trust... to unpolluted waters."' 9' Since this Act essentially codified the public
trust doctrine, the Federal Claims Court's decision indicates that the public trust
doctrine itself would serve as a suitable background principle.
In Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, the public
trust doctrine was unsuccessfully raised by the federal government as a defense
to a total regulatory taking.9 However, crucial to the failure of the public trust
doctrine defense was the fact that, in California, the State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB), not the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, determined the
scope of the doctrine.92 More importantly, the court stated that "[t]here is, in the
end, no dispute that... plaintiffs' contract rights [were] subject to the doctrine
[] of ... public trust." 93 The public trust defense failed because the role of
determining the doctrine's applicability to tidelands was vested in the SWRCB,
not the federal government.94 Therefore, South Carolina should have the power
to defend regulatory takings claims using this doctrine.
California courts have long been receptive to the idea that the public trust
doctrine can be used as a defense so as to prevent the government from having
to compensate a landowner for a regulatory taking. For example, in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court ofAlpine County, the California Supreme
Court stated that "the determination that the property [is] subject to the trust,
despite its implication as to future uses and improvements, [is] not considered
a taking requiring compensation."' The court reasoned that the public trust
doctrine is not merely an affirmation of the State's power to use lands for the
public benefit; additionally, it "is an affirmation of the duty of the state to
protect the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare cases when the
abandonment of that right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.
96
Furthermore, the Lucas decision itself indicates that the public trust
doctrine is the type of principle that the U.S. Supreme Court envisioned when
it explained the concept of background principles of common law. The Lucas
Court explained that one of the inquiries that a total takings analysis should
involve is "the degree of harm to public lands and resources... posed by the
claimant's proposed activities. " 9 ' Chief Justice Toal, in Sierra Club, identified
this exact inquiry as the key question in determining whether public trust lands
should be permitted to be used privately. 98 Justice Toal's reasoning indicates
90. Id. (quoting TFNN. CODE. ANN. § 69-3-102(a) (1995)).
91. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313,324 (2001).
92. Id. at 322.
93. Id. at 324.
94. See id.
95. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 685 P.2d 709,723 n.22 (Cal.
1983).
96. Id. at 724; see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
97. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030-31 (1992).
98. Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assoes., 318 S.C. 119, 128,456 S.E.2d 397,402 (1995).
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that the public trust doctrine should be accepted as a background principle of
common law by South Carolina courts.
In an article discussing Lucas's impact on wetlands and barrier island
beaches, Professor Hope M. Babcock identifies several arguments that states
have presented to the courts concerning why the public trust doctrine should
bar a regulatory takings claim. 99 First, when dealing with public trust lands,
private interests are subservient to public interests, as evidenced by the state's
inability to alienate public trust lands in favor of private interests.' Thus,
"[t]he land in question is not, like ordinary private land held in fee simple
absolute, subject to development at the sole whim of the owner, but is
impressed with a public trust, which gives the public's representatives an
interest and responsibility in its development."10' Second, the public trust
interest in the land originated before the private interest did.' Therefore, the
landowner has no title to the land in the first place, and the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause affords him no protection because he cannot claim a property
right which he never possessed.03
In another scholarly article, Paul Sarahan argues that using the public trust
doctrine as a defense in regulatory takings actions will not lead to inequitable
results."° Because a landowner purchases land "with, at least, constructive
knowledge" that tidelands are subject to the public trust, denying him recovery
for a regulatory taking would not be an unfair or unexpected result. 5
Thus, based on the holdings of courts in other jurisdictions, statements
made by the South Carolina Supreme Court, and scholarly commentary, it
appears that South Carolina courts will accept the public trust doctrine as a
defense to regulatory takings actions dealing with tidelands. Moreover, South
Carolina's public trust doctrine does not appear to be substantially different
from the public trust doctrine in other jurisdictions,' which further indicates
that South Carolina courts will likely follow otherjurisdictions' applications of
the doctrine to total regulatory takings cases.
However, both the McQueen case and Professor Babcock's article raise an
interesting issue: what results if the landowner undoubtedly owned title to land
that had been solid ground, but which later reverted to wetlands?0 7 Do these
99. Babcock, supra note 48, at 56-58.
100. Id. at 56-57.
101. Id. at57 (quoting Boston WaterfrontDev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356,
367 (Mass. 1979)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 57-58 (citations omitted).
104. See Sarahan, supra note 49, at 564.
105. Id.
106. Compare Lowcountry Open Land Trust v. State, No. 3388, 2001 S.C. App. LEXIS
121, at *6 (S.C. Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2001) (holding that "[tihe State of South Carolina holds
presumptive title to all tidelands within its borders, which are held in trust for the benefit of the
public.") with Fafard v. Conservation Comm'n of Barnstable, 733 N.E.2d 66,70 (Mass. 2000)
(defining the public trust as land between the high and low water marks).
107. See supra Part II.A; Babcock, supra note 48, at 57-58.
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lands become part of the public trust when they revert to tidelands? If so, can
the public trust doctrine still be used as a defense to prevent compensation
when a complete regulatory takings occurs?
V. MCQUEENREVISITED: CAN THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE BE USED AS A
DEFENSE TO A TOTAL REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIM WHEN PRIVATELY-
OWNED PROPERTY HAS REVERTED TO TIDELANDS?
InMcQueen, the property in question did not contain any public trust lands
(tidelands) when it was purchased thirty years prior to the institution of the
takings claim. '0 The two lots were created by fill and were located adjacent to
man-made saltwater canals.'09 However, due to erosion and McQueen's failure
to take any preventive measures, a portion of the land reverted to wetlands."0
Therefore, it is first crucial to determine whether these tidelands are part of the
public trust.
Employing a strict interpretation of the public trust definition in South
Carolina, McQueen's lots are part of the public trust. Since South Carolina's
adoption of the public trust doctrine, the state's courts have held that lands
between the high and low water marks are part of the public trust."' If there is
to be an exception to this rule in a case such as McQueen, then South Carolina
courts are free to make such a ruling."2 However, current jurisprudence on the
public trust doctrine has not indicated that such an exception will be made.
Protecting newly-formed wetlands that have encroached onto private
property by including them as part of the public trust is supported by the same
policy considerations that justify applying the public trust doctrine to tidelands
in general. Tidelands are generally afforded protection due to the crucial
ecological functions they perform. "' These functions include: protecting water
quality by filtering sediments, pollutants, and excess nutrients out of the water;
preventing flooding by collecting runoff; preventing erosion; providing rearing
grounds and food for commercially important fish species; serving as a home
to endangered flora and fauna; and serving as a habitat for aquatic life and
migratory waterfowl."' Additionally, in Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort
Associates, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized the importance of
considering factors such as the wetlands' effect on water quality andmarine life
when making the determination of whether to allow private use of public trust
108. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 70, 530 S.E.2d 628, 631
(2000).
109. Id. at 67, 530 S.E.2d at 630.
110. Id. at 70, 530 S.E.2d at 631.
111. State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 83-84 (1884).
112. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1987) (granting states
"the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust... as they see fit").
113. Sarahan, supra note 49, at 538-39.
114. Id.
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lands."1 5 Therefore, regardless of whether tidelands are newly formed or have
been in existence for centuries, they still play a crucial ecological role. Thus,
the policy underlying the public trust doctrine supports the notion that newly-
formed tidelands should be afforded the protections of the public trust doctrine.
Private use of tidelands like those inMcQueen arguably should be allowed
considering that their size is minimal relative to the total size of all tidelands in
South Carolina and that the impact on tidelands' total ecological role likely
would be minimal. However, the adoption of this viewpoint by the South
Carolina Supreme Court would certainly have deleterious environmental
ramifications. In this day of rampant coastal development and with waterfront
property at an absolute premium, areas around coastal tidelands are constantly
being enveloped by urban sprawl." 6 Because the coastline is increasingly
threatened by this urban sprawl, protecting the tidelands is more crucial now
than it ever has been. While the ecosystem as a whole would probably not be
affected by allowing McQueen to bulkhead and fill his two lots or by
compensating McQueen for the value of his property, allowing this result
would almost certainly trigger similar results in other cases, ultimately leading
to more serious consequences.
If newly-formed wetlands were not part of the public trust when a
landowner purchased his land, then public interests cannot be considered when
determining whether the wetlands should be used for private purposes.
However, this argument can be rebutted by the fact that a landowner who
purchases land adjacent to tidelands has, at a minimum, constructive
knowledge of both the public trust doctrine and the "water's inherent tendency
to change its borders."".7 Thus, the landowner assumes the risk that his land
may revert to tidelands, and he therefore has the duty to prevent the tidelands
from encroaching on his property. If he fails in this duty, he is economically
punished in that his land becomes impressed with the public trust."'
Although holding that McQueen's lands are part of the public trust and
denying him compensation seems like an unduly harsh result, this result is not
unfair considering McQueen purchased his property subject to the public trust
doctrine and to the inherent risk of tidelands' changing their boundaries.
Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court apparently did not feel that
such a result would be unduly harsh; the court seemed largely to base its
decision on the fact that McQueen "neglected his property for thirty years,
allowed the land to revert to wetlands, and [then] expect[ed] the State of South
Carolina to pay him the going rate for high ground-a twenty-fold return on his
115. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
116. See Jeffrey Allen, The Changing Landscape of the South Carolina Coast: How Do
We Measure It?, 2 INSIGHT 13, 13-14 (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.strom.clemson.edu
insight/insight2-4.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2002).
117. Sarahan, supra note 49, at 564 (footnote omitted).
118. Id.
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initial investment."" 9 Therefore, denying McQueen compensation for a
regulatory taking does not seem unduly harsh but instead seems perfectly fair.
On the contrary, allowing McQueen to recover would be an unduly harsh result
for the State because a careless landowner would benefit from his own
carelessness.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tidelands that have spread onto private property should be considered part
of the public trust for the following two reasons: tidelands generally have
beneficial ecological effects and the landowner has the opportunity to prevent
such encroachment from occurring.'20 Allowing a landowner to recover for a
taking seems akin to allowing him to benefit from lands that have been
dedicated to the public trust. Therefore, the question of whether to allow a
landowner to be compensated for a regulatory taking in such a situation
requires an analysis similar to that used to determine if public trust lands can
be used for private purposes. Under Sierra Club, the proper test in South
Carolina is whether the private use substantially impairs the public's interest
in public trust lands, considering factors such as marine life, water quality, and
public access.''
In the rehearing of McQueen, the South Carolina Supreme Court may
address many of the questions posed in this Note.'" In analyzing the issues,
the court should take a broad view of the public trust doctrine like many other
jurisdictions have done and should consider the many public policy factors
underlying the doctrine. The court should also ponder the ramifications the
decision could have on the future of the public trust doctrine, regulatory takings
law, and coastal tidelands. Finding the public trust doctrine to be a background
principle barring McQueen from maintaining a takings claim would produce
a just result-McQueen would not receive an economic windfall after
neglecting his property for many years. Holding to the contrary would have a
deleterious environmental impact, as the State would be committed to
119. McQueen v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 340 S.C. 65, 70, 530 S.E.2d 628, 631
(2000).
120. See supra Part V.
121. Sierra Club v. Kiawah Resort Assocs., 318 S.C. 119, 128,456 S.E.2d 397,402(1995).
122. The case's outcome will depend largely on whether the State is allowed to argue that
the public trust doctrine is a background principle of common law. In the South Carolina
Supreme Court's original hearing of McQueen, the State was not allowed to present such
arguments because they were not made in the lower courts. McQueen, 340 S.C. at 70 n.2, 530
S.E.2d at 631 n.2. However, it is crucial to note that the court ruled in favor of the State based
on McQueen's lack of investment-backed expectations. Id. at 77, 530 S.E.2d at 635. Now that
this portion of the decision has been reversed by Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the court may be
inclined to hear the State's public trust argument. This inclination is evidenced by the court's
apparent hostility toward McQueen due to his apparent neglect of his land. Id. at 70, 530 S.E.
2d at 631.
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compensating other landowners in similar situations."2 Furthermore, coastal
tidelands would become more susceptible to private use due to a weakening of
the public trust doctrine. This issue will undoubtedly arise again in South
Carolina, and it is crucial that the South Carolina Supreme Court enunciate a
firm expansion of the public trust doctrine to preserve the character of the
South Carolina coast.
DanielA. Nussbaum
123. Having to compensate landowners in similar situations would be an extremely
undesirable result, especially considering the high values of coastal property. However, the State
would be unlikely to concede a total taking of all economically beneficial value as it did in
McQueen, thus leaving itself the opportunity to argue lack of investment-backed expectations
or another partial regulatory takings defense. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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